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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, TOWN OF 
SMITHTOWN UNIT, SUFFOLK LOCAL 552, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13387 
TOWN OF SMITHTOWN, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (PAUL S. BAMBERGER Of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
JOHN B. ZOLLO, ESQ. (JAYSON J.R. CHOI Of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Town of Smithtown Unit, Suffolk Local 552 (CSEA) to a decision by 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its improper 
practice charge alleging that the Town of Smithtown (Town) 
violated §209-a.l(a), (c), (d) and (e) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) . CSEA alleges that the Town harassed 
and demoted the CSEA unit president and laid off twenty-five 
employees in retaliation for their exercise of rights protected 
by the Act. 
The ALJ dismissed the §209-a.l(d) and (e) allegations for no 
proof. She further found that only two employees, William 
Board - U-13387 -2 
Maccaro and Allen Olsen, had been engaged in protected 
activities^7, of which the Town was aware, but that the twenty-
five employees had not engaged in such activities and, 
furthermore, had not been laid off improperly. The ALJ further 
found that Maccaro and Olsen were not improperly bumped to lower 
positions due to their protected activities. 
CSEA excepts to the ALJ's decision on three grounds: first, 
that she did not evaluate the testimony of one of its witnesses, 
Thomas Heester; second, that CSEA had met its burden of proof 
based on the timing of Maccaro's demotion; and third, that the 
ALJ improperly referred to Maccaro's disability^ in reaching 
her determination. The Town supports the ALJ's decision. 
After a review of the record and consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The ALJ found^ that the Town ceased operation of its 
landfill on January 1, 1992, and reopened it as a cleanfill^, 
decreasing its usage by 85%. In anticipation of the change in 
^Maccaro was the CSEA unit president from 1982 to 1992. He was 
promoted from laborer to Automotive Equipment Operator (AEO) 
while on full release time as president and never performed the 
duties of the AEO position. Olsen was a shop steward. 
^CSEA alleges in its brief in support of its exceptions that 
Maccaro has a prosthetic device in place of his right hand. 
^The ALJ made several credibility resolutions in reaching her 
decision. She generally credited the testimony of the Town's 
witnesses over CSEA's witnesses. Except as specifically 
addressed by CSEA in its exceptions, her credibility resolutions 
remain unchallenged and this decision recites the facts as the 
ALJ found them. 
^A cleanfill accepts only yard waste and construction debris, 
not household waste. 
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usage, the Town decreased by almost half the budget of the 
Sanitation and Sewage Department (Department), which operated the 
landfill. Andrew Wolke, Department Superintendent, was 
instructed by the Town Board to lay off Department employees. 
Eileen Tropea, Town Personnel Director, met with Maccaro to 
discuss the seniority dates of Department employees to determine 
the order of the layoffs. Tropea asserted that a Town-wide 
seniority date was appropriate and Maccaro agreed.-7 On 
December 31, 1991, 25 out of 70 Department employees were laid 
off, including 8 Heavy Equipment Operators (HEO).& 
In the early spring of 1992, Wolke was instructed by the 
Town Board to make further reductions. When he protested, the 
Board reviewed the usage of the cleanfill and determined that the 
number of days it was open could be reduced, as could the number 
of hours it was open each day. Effective April 1, 1992, Wolke 
laid off seventeen additional employees, including three of the 
^The collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time of 
the layoffs provided, in section 6(A), that seniority was to be 
determined from the date of an employee's original permanent 
employment with the Town and, in section 6(B), that layoffs would 
be made within a department, within a classification, utilizing 
the seniority date set in accordance with section 6(A). 
^Olsen, as an HEO, was affected by the December 31, 1991 layoff, 
but bumped into a laborer's position. The ALJ found that Olsen 
would have been laid off using either a Town-wide seniority date 
or a Department-wide date. She found no improper motivation in 
his layoff. CSEA's exceptions do not dispute the ALJ's findings 
as to Olsen. 
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four AEOs.Z/ while Maccaro had longer time within the 
Department, utilizing Town-wide seniority as had been done in 
December 1991, one AEO had more seniority than Maccaro, so 
Maccaro became one of the AEOs who were laid off. As with Olsen, 
Maccaro was able to bump back to a laborer's position. 
A unit employee, Thomas Heester, was also an AEO who was 
laid off at the same time as Maccaro and was able to bump into a 
laborer position in the Department. He testified that in 
December 1992, after this charge was filed, Wolke told him that 
it was a shame that he had to be laid off, but it was the only 
thing he could do to get to Maccaro. Wolke denied the statement, 
testifying that Heester was seeking his help in obtaining a 
transfer to the Town's Parks Department and that Heester told him 
that he must have gotten caught in the cross fire. Wolke 
testified that he did not respond to that comment but did say it 
was a shame that Heester had to be laid off. 
CSEA argues that because the ALT did not specifically refer 
to Heester's testimony in making credibility determinations, her 
decision should be reversed. That she did not specifically 
mention Heester in her credibility resolution does not lead us to 
conclude that she failed to consider his testimony. The ALT 
^Wolke testified that his decision was motivated by the large 
number of cuts that the laborers had already suffered and that he 
needed a certain number of laborers to maintain operation of the 
cleanfill. With the reduction in hours and days of operation, as 
well as a decrease in the amount of waste accepted, Wolke 
believed that he could operate with fewer AEOs. Additionally, 
HEOs can perform the duties of the AEOs, while AEOs cannot 
function as HEOs. 
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recited Heester's testimony in some detail in her decision. It 
is, therefore, clear that she considered his testimony. It is 
equally clear that she did not credit Heester's version of his 
conversation with Wolke. 
The ALJ decided that CSEA had failed to establish anti-union 
animus on the part of Wolke and that the Town had legitimate 
business reasons for the reduction in the Department's workforce. 
The record evidence fully supports her determination. The 
landfill, where the laid off employees had been assigned, ceased 
operation and the Town reduced the Department's budget by almost 
half. Following such an action, layoffs were inevitable. CSEA 
does not really argue, nor is there any basis whatsoever to 
conclude, that the Town laid off over forty employees just to 
retaliate against Maccaro for his activities as unit 
president.& 
As to CSEA's remaining exception that the ALJ improperly 
referred to Maccaro's disability in her decision, we deny it as 
without merit. The ALJ made no reference to Maccaro's physical 
condition in her decision. Even had the ALJ mentioned Maccaro's 
-
7CSEA points to Maccaro's refusal to agree to the creation of a 
new position within the Department in December 1991 as the 
motivating factor in Wolke's decision that Maccaro would be one 
of the employees laid off in April 1992. As discussed, the Town 
offered legitimate reasons for its decision and the timing of 
Maccaro's layoff in April 1992 is insufficient to call those 
reasons into question. Indeed, if Wolke were determined to 
punish Maccaro for that action, it is more likely that he would 
have laid him off in December 1991, since he did not know until 
March 1992 that the Town would require a further reduction in the 
Department's work force. 
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physical condition, we find no basis to conclude that an accurate 
statement of fact could have resulted in an erroneous decision. 
For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's exceptions are 
denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 27, 1995 
Albany, New York 
M\A,l~- N- J£\KJA i*. 
Pauling R. Kinsella, chairperson 
EriafJ. Schmertz, Member4' 
28-12/^7/^5 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCHENECTADY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15284 
CITY OF SCHENECTADY, 
Respondent. 
6RASS0 & GRASSO (JANE K. FININ of counsel), for Charging 
Party 
ROEMER, WALLENS & MINEAUX, LLP (ELAYNE 6. GOLD and LIESL K. 
ZWICKLBAUER of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Schenectady 
Police Benevolent Association (PBA) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its charge that the 
City of Schenectady (City) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
instituted a new procedure for the payment under General 
Municipal Law §207-c for chiropractic treatment for job-related 
injuries. 
The ALJ held that the City was permitted to require physical 
examinations by the City physician of police officers, injured in 
the performance of their duties, who sought chiropractic 
treatment over a period of time. He held that the language of 
GML §207-c, which empowers municipal health authorities to attend 
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to any police officer injured in the performance of his or her 
duties for the purpose of rendering treatment or making 
inspections^7, gives the City the authority to require a 
physical to determine if the course of treatment prescribed by 
the chiropractor is necessary and how long the treatment should 
continue. 
The PBA excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that he erred 
in several respects in determining that the City's decision was 
not mandatorily bargainable. The City seeks affirmance of the 
ALJ's decision. 
After a review of the record and consideration of the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
Section §207-c of the GML provides, in relevant part, that 
the municipal health authorities or any physician 
appointed for the purpose by the municipality, after a 
determination has first been made that such injury or 
sickness was incurred during, or resulted from, such 
performance of duty, may attend any such injured or 
sick policeman, from time to time, for the purpose of 
providing medical, surgical or other treatment, or for 
making inspections.... 
A recent decision of the Court of Appeals makes clear that 
GML §207-c 
authorizes a municipality to direct an applicant to 
undergo a medical examination to provide information 
upon which the municipality may make a determination 
that an injury or illness occurred in the performance 
of duty prior to the awarding of benefits. This 
conclusion results both from the plain wording of the 
^GML §207-c(l). 
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statute and from the purpose of General Municipal Law 
1207-c.27 
The Court has also held in another recent decision, Schenectady 
Police Benevolent Association v. New York State Public Employment 
Relations Board (hereafter Schenectady)^. as follows: 
It is settled that the Taylor Law...generally 
requires bargaining between public employers and 
employees regarding terms and conditions of employment 
(citation omitted). The policy of such bargaining in 
this State is "strong" and "sweeping". Even that 
policy, however, is negated under special 
circumstances. It is unquestioned that the bargaining 
mandate may be circumscribed by "plain" and "clear" 
legislative intent or by statutory provisions 
indicating the Legislature's "inescapably implicit" 
design to do so. (Citing to Webster Central School 
District v. PERB. 75 N.Y.2d 619, 627, 23 PERB 57013 
(1990). 
The Court went on to hold in Schenectady that certain 
requirements established unilaterally by the City as conditions 
to its payment of GML §207-c benefits were not intended by the 
legislature under GML §207-c to constitute mandatorily negotiable 
subj ects. 
Because a municipality, under GML §207-c, may unilaterally 
require inspections of an officer we hold that it may require the 
officer to be seen by its physician to determine the status and 
duration of the officer's injury while treatment is continuing. 
The City's decision to require physical inspection as a condition 
precedent to payment of GML §207-c benefits has been plainly and 
clearly removed by the legislature from the scope of compulsory 
^DePaolo v. County of Schenectady. 85 N.Y.2d 527, at 531 (1995). 
^85 N.Y.2d 480, 28 PERB J[7005, at 7012 (1995). 
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negotiation. Thus, we need not decide whether the City's 
directive was newly created, as the PBA argues, or was a 
continuation of a past practice, as claimed by the City, because 
the directive was not mandatorily negotiable. 
Based on the foregoing, the PBA's exceptions are denied and 
the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 27, 1995 
Albany, New York 
% J , 1 ^ % X-\c\<A\ 
Pau l ihe R« K i n s e l l a , Chai rperson 
- ^ ^ i . 
E r i c iT"." Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
POLICE COMMUNICATION AND TELETYPE 
OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE VILLAGE 
OF LAKE SUCCESS, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13272 
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF LAKE SUCCESS, 
Respondent. 
SCHLACTER & MAURO (REYNOLD A. MAURO of counsel), for 
Charging Party 
D'MATO, FORCHELLI, LIBERT, SCHWARTZ, MINEO, LAURINO & 
CARLINO (PETER R. MINEO of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the 
Incorporated Village of Lake Success (Village) to a decision by 
an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed by the Police 
Communication and Teletype Operators Association of the Village 
of Lake Success (Association). The Association alleges that the 
Village refused its demands to negotiate a successor to an 
expired 1987-90 collective bargaining agreement. After a 
hearing, the ALJ held that the Village had refused to negotiate 
as alleged. The ALJ found the charge timely and held that the 
Village had recognized the Association as the bargaining agent 
for police dispatchers. 
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The Village in its exceptions disputes both of the ALT's 
controlling determinations. The Association in response has 
resubmitted its brief to the ALJ. 
Having reviewed the record and having considered the 
parties' arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision as to the 
timeliness of the charge, but dismiss on the merits. 
We begin by addressing some confusion regarding the nature 
of this charge, which is apparent in parts of the ALJ's decision 
and in certain of the parties' arguments. As filed, amended, 
litigated and determined, the charge alleges only a refusal to 
bargain pursuant to demand. The timeliness of such a charge is 
measured from the date of last refusal.-7 The dates of any 
arguable unilateral changes in terms and conditions of employment 
are immaterial because the charge does not rest on a unilateral 
change theory. The last demand to negotiate was made by letter 
on November 4, 1991. There was no response to that demand. The 
charge was filed on February 27, 1992, a date within four months 
of the date of last demand to bargain and, therefore, necessarily 
also within four months of any later date the demand could be 
deemed reasonably to have been refused by the Village. The 
charge is, therefore, timely. 
^See, e.g. , Village of Malone, 8 PERB [^3045 (1975) . 
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As the refusal to negotiate is admitted, the only question 
remaining is whether the Village recognized the Association as a 
bargaining agent for the dispatchers for purposes of the Act.-/ 
The ALJ held that language in the parties' 1987-90 agreement 
and their course of conduct established that the Village had 
recognized the Association for purposes of the Act. 
The 1987-90 document is captioned a "letter of 
understanding". The body of the document itself, however, uses 
"letter of understanding" and "agreement" interchangeably. It 
covers a variety of terms and conditions of employment for a 
fixed period of time. The table of contents references a 
"recognition". Article I, Section 2 states that the Village 
"recognizes" the "Police Dispatchers" as a "separate unit" for 
the implementation of an "agreement" covering permanent, full-
time police dispatchers. 
We find the recognition statement itself to be ambiguous 
regarding an intent to recognize the Association or, for that 
matter, any employee organization. Recognition can only be 
extended to an employee organization as defined in the Act. The 
1987-90 document does not contain any reference to the 
Association or any other employee organization and purports to 
extend recognition to employees or job titles. Such a 
"recognition" of employees would have no effect under the Act. 
-
7The ALJ found the Association to be an employee organization 
within the meaning of §201.5 of the Act and no exceptions have 
been taken to that determination. 
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Moreover, the letter of understanding is signed by the Village's 
dispatchers above lines referencing only their job title, not any 
office within any organizational entity. These parts of the 
1987-90 letter of understanding are inconsistent with an intent 
to recognize an employee organization for purposes of collective 
negotiations under the Act. However, that document does refer to 
a "unit" and an "agreement", words which can evidence the 
establishment of a statutory bargaining relationship. Therefore, 
if recognition is to be found to have been extended to the 
Association, we must look beyond the language in the 1987-90 
letter of understanding. But, in looking beyond that document, 
we find nothing which clearly evidences an intent to recognize 
the Association, and some things which clearly evidence a 
contrary intent. 
It is clear from the record that from the Village's 
perspective it did not intend to extend recognition to any 
employee organization for purposes of representation of 
dispatchers. The Village's only witness was Robert Bernstein, 
who was a Village trustee from 1986 to 1992. In 1987, he was the 
trustee liaison with the police dispatchers. As Bernstein's 
testimony is fairly characterized, the Village never intended to 
create a bargaining relationship under the Act with any employee 
organization acting on behalf of the dispatchers, and it was not 
his understanding that a bargaining relationship is even what the 
dispatchers wanted. Rather, he testified without contradiction 
that the dispatchers requested the letter of understanding to 
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have something "visible" as to how the Village "would react" to 
them. 
The proposal submitted by the dispatchers for a successor to 
the expiring 1987-90 letter of understanding on its face confirms 
the Village's understanding that it did not extend recognition to 
an employee organization as a representative of the dispatchers. 
One of the dispatchers' own proposals states that the Village is 
to provide dispatchers "with the same employment benefits as all 
other non-bargaining Village employees" (emphasis added). The 
emphasized portion of the proposal reflects the dispatchers' own 
belief that they are not represented for purposes of the Act for 
it includes them with other unrepresented employees. Moreover, 
that same package of proposals, for reasons which were not 
articulated, does not contain any recognition statement at all, 
not even the one appearing in the 1987-90 letter of 
understanding. 
Shirley Giambruno, the dispatcher who was involved in some 
of the meetings with the Village, testified that she copied the 
language quoted above from a CSEA agreement and she did not 
intend by this proposal to change the Association's recognition. 
The language from the CSEA agreement which she quoted at the 
hearing, however, is a traditional recognition clause which does 
not refer to the employees CSEA represents as "non-bargaining" 
employees. In addition, Giambruno testified that she objected to 
the Village's 1990 policy statement contained in a 1990 career 
plan for dispatchers. That policy statement, like the 
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dispatchers7 own proposal, states that the dispatchers are to be 
provided the same benefits as "all other" nonbargaining Village 
employees. Giambruno testified that she objected to this 
language because she believed it removed recognition. However, 
this is precisely the same language as appears in the 
dispatchers' own proposal for a successor to the 1987-90 letter 
of understanding. Even if Giambruno's inconsistent testimony can 
be harmonized, we are still left with the same basic question. 
Although Giambruno may not have wanted to or intended to chancre 
the Association's status, we must still decide what status, if 
any, the Association holds. If never recognized, Giambruno's 
reaction to language ostensibly removing recognition could not 
bestow upon the Association a status it never held. 
An intent to recognize can be established by a course of 
conduct establishing a de facto recognition.-7 The ALT relied 
upon that course of conduct to conclude that the Village was 
engaged in collective negotiations with the Association as the 
bargaining agent for the employees. What meetings and 
discussions there were, however, are at least equally susceptible 
to a conclusion that the Village voluntarily engaged in 
discussions and entered into an agreement with each of the 
dispatchers directly and not through the auspices of any employee 
organization. Indeed, there does not appear to be any reference 
^Elba Cent. Sch. Dist., 16 PERB.K3003 (1983), aff #g 15 PERB 
[^4599 (1982) , enforcement granted, 17 PERB f7011 (Sup. Ct. 
Genesee Co. 1984). 
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to any organizational entity and certainly there is no reference 
to the existence of the Association as an organization until the 
bargaining dispute underlying this charge arose. 
In Town of Clay v. Helsbv^ (hereafter Town of Clay), the 
Appellate Division, Forth Department, held that the recognition 
of an employee organization by a legislative body should be 
"visible" and must not be left to "conjecture". In that case, 
the Court held that there was no recognition in circumstances 
more compelling than here. In Town of Clay,, the Town supervisor, 
acting in response to a clear demand for recognition, apprised 
the legislative body of the demand. Although the legislative 
body was aware that the supervisor had agreed to a negotiating 
unit and had ascertained the union's majority status, the 
legislative body never instructed the Town's supervisor to desist 
from his activities. The Town's supervisor thereafter formally 
recognized the union by letter and began negotiating with the 
union. Only then did the legislative body disavow the 
recognition. 
What the Court required in Town of Clav for an effective 
recognition was "some objective evidence of acceptance by the 
[legislative body] so that determination of the facts do (sic) 
not depend upon conj ecture." 
In this case, there is no recognition of an employee 
organization in the 1987-90 letter of understanding. The 
^45 A.D.2d 292, 7 PERB 57012 (4th Dep't 1974). 
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language from that document which the Association claims to 
constitute its recognition is unclear at best, if not 
inconsistent with an intent to recognize an employee organization 
even if the language reflects an intent to create a bargaining 
unit. There is no publication of recognition pursuant to §2 01.6 
of our Rules of Procedure. There is no evidence that the Village 
ever undertook to ascertain the majority status of the 
Association or even that an employee organization existed when 
recognition was allegedly extended or during the parties' 
meetings. The course of conduct between the parties is subject 
to differing interpretations even when viewed most favorably to 
the Association. Even assuming the 1987-90 letter of 
understanding constitutes a binding contract, the existence of 
such a contract does not establish the existence of a statutory 
bargaining relationship between the Village and an employee 
organization. There clearly can be and are contractual 
relationships arrived at after negotiations between an employer 
and one or more of its employees which arise wholly apart from 
the bargaining processes under the Act. What may be the 
strongest evidence in support of our conclusion that the 
Association was not recognized as a bargaining agent is that the 
dispatchers in written proposals for 1990 refer to themselves as 
"non-bargaining" employees and they simultaneously delete without 
explanation any reference to a recognition clause of any type. 
What we have on this record, therefore, is two differing 
beliefs: the dispatchers believing that the Village extended 
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recognition to an employee organization on their behalf; the 
Village believing that it simply tried to accommodate the 
dispatchers with a written description of their terms and 
conditions of employment because it valued them as employees. To 
conclude that the Association was recognized by the Village would 
cause us to engage in the very speculation and conjecture against 
which Town of Clay cautions. Lacking clear, objective evidence 
of the Town's intent to recognize the Association or, indeed, any 
employee organization, we must reverse the ALJ's decision on the 
merits. An employee organization acting on behalf of the 
dispatchers may demand recognition from the Village and may 
pursue certification from us as necessary. However, the Town is 
not presently under a bargaining obligation with the Association 
and, therefore, it had no duty to respond to any of the 
Association's bargaining demands. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed to the extent she found the charge to be timely, but it 
is otherwise reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 27, 1995 
Albany, New York 
w^ X veil's. 
PauliHO.' Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric/J. Schmertz, Membe 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNIFORMED PATROLMEN'S ASSOCIATION 
OF THE GREECE POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15551 
TOWN OF GREECE, 
Respondent. 
W. JAMES SCHWAN, ESQ., for Charging Party 
BERNARD WINTERMAN, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Uniformed 
Patrolmen's Association of the Greece Police Department (UPA) to 
a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge it 
filed against the Town of Greece (Town). UPA alleges that the 
Town refused to bargain both the imposition of a fourth 
platoon-^ and the impact thereof. After a hearing, the ALJ held 
that UPA had waived by agreement to a management rights clause 
and a "complete agreement" clause any right to bargain the 
creation of the fourth platoon and had abandoned any impact 
bargaining by ending negotiations in response to a proposal by 
the Town which it found objectionable. 
1/The Town has had three platoons covering 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 
a.m.; 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.; and 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. The 
fourth platoon, one in addition to the other three, covers 12:00 
p.m. to 8:00 p.m. 
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UPA argues in its exceptions that the A U wrongly concluded 
both that it had waived its right to bargain the decision to have 
a fourth platoon and had abandoned a right to bargain the effects 
of that decision. The Town has not filed a response. 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the ALJ's decision 
regarding waiver of decisional bargaining, but reverse insofar as 
the ALJ held that UPA had also waived or abandoned a right to 
impact bargaining. 
The management rights clause in the parties7 agreement 
specifically gives the Town the right to "schedule working 
hours". The complete agreement clause exempts both parties from 
any duty to negotiate during the contract period those subjects 
which are "referred to or covered in this agreement". The 
management rights clause alone would warrant affirmance of the 
ALJ's decision regarding dismissal of the decisional bargaining 
allegations. In combination with the complete agreement clause, 
the decisional bargaining waiver is compelling. UPA argues, 
however, that there can be no waiver because neither clause 
specifically refers to platoons. Nothing in any of our 
decisions, however, reguires that degree of specificity as a 
condition to finding a waiver of further bargaining rights. To 
the contrary, even a broad articulation of management rights has 
been held to constitute a waiver if the intent to waive is 
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sufficiently plain and clear.27 Indeed, we have held numerous 
times that an employer's contractual right to "regulate work 
schedules" constitutes a waiver of further bargaining regarding a 
variety of changes in work hours, work weeks, and work shifts.57 
The Town's prior willingness to negotiate or consult with 
UPA regarding changes in work hours or schedules is immaterial to 
the waiver analysis. As the ALJ correctly recognized, the Town 
was entitled to revert to the terms of its contract rights, which 
clearly give it the right to schedule work notwithstanding any 
prior practice to the contrary. That right of reversion is 
necessary if an employer's incentive to deviate from the contract 
to extend more favorable terms to a bargaining agent and the 
employees it represents is to be preserved. 
We find, however, no waiver or abandonment by UPA of its 
right to negotiate the impact of the fourth platoon. Although 
the Town refused to meet with UPA for impact negotiations unless 
UPA agreed to waive its right to take any impasse which might 
arise in the impact negotiations through the Act's interest 
arbitration impasse procedures, the ALJ held that UPA's failure, 
at that point, to file a new improper practice charge or a 
declaration of impasse constituted an abandonment of any impact 
^Deer Park Union Free Sch. Dist.. 28 PERB 53038 (1995) ; Garden 
Citv Union Free Sch. Dist.. 27 PERB 53029 (1994); County of 
Livingston, 26 PERB 53074 (1993); Town of Greece. 26 PERB 53032 
(1993); Sachem Cent. Sch. Dist.. 21 PERB 53021 (1988). 
^County of Nassau. 24 PERB 53027 (1991); County of Nassau. 
13 PERB 53053 (1980). 
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bargaining rights. We do not agree with this conclusion. Having 
this charge already pending, UPA was not required to file yet 
another charge claiming a refusal to bargain. Furthermore, even 
assuming that UPA might have been able to file a declaration of 
impasse immediately in response to the Town's stated condition, 
the availability of that option does not privilege the Town's 
refusal to meet, nor does it constitute a waiver or abandonment 
of UPA's right to charge the Town with a refusal to bargain. The 
record is clear that the Town refused to negotiate impact unless 
the UPA waived its right to use the applicable interest 
arbitration provisions of the Act. As presented, the Town's 
condition was not merely a proposal, it was a condition to 
meeting upon which it insisted. The Town had no right to insist 
upon a waiver by UPA of its statutory rights as a condition to 
fulfilling its own statutory duties and that insistence 
constituted a refusal to negotiate the impact of the fourth 
platoon as alleged. We, therefore, find that the Town refused to 
negotiate upon demand the impact of the establishment of a fourth 
platoon.^ 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed to the extent it dismisses the decisional bargaining 
allegations, but reversed insofar as the ALJ dismissed the impact 
bargaining allegations. 
^A remand to the ALJ is inappropriate in this particular case 
because the Town's refusal to meet is admitted. Having reversed 
the ALJ's abandonment rationale, there is simply nothing in 
dispute factually or legally which would warrant a remand. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Town cease and desist 
from conditioning negotiations regarding the impact of a fourth 
platoon upon a waiver by UPA of its right to invoke the 
applicable impasse procedures of the Act, that it negotiate in 
good faith with UPA regarding such impact and that it sign and 
post notice in the form attached in all locations ordinarily used 
to post notices of information to UPA unit employees. 
DATED: December 27, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric J/ Schmertz, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT (Act) 
We hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Uniformed Patrolmen's Association of the Greece Police 
Department (UPA) that the Town of Greece will not condition negotiations regarding the impact of a fourth platoon upon a 
waiver by UPA of its right to invoke the applicable impasse procedures of the Act and that it will negotiate in good faith with 
UPA regarding such impact. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
TOWN OF GREECE 
_ js Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COMMUNICATION WORKERS OP AMERICA, LOCAL 1170, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15937 
TOWN OF HENRIETTA, 
Respondent. 
SHAPIRO, ROSENBAUM & LIEBSCHUTZ (PETER NELSON of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
HARRIS BEACH & WILCOX, LLP* (JEFFREY D. WILLIAMS of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of 
Henrietta (Town) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(AKJ) on a charge filed by the Communication Workers of America, 
Local 1170 (CWA). CWA alleges that the Town violated §209-a.l(a) 
and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when 
it abolished positions held by CWA stewards Scott Mangino and 
John McCombs and reassigned CWA activist Marlene Youngman. After 
a hearing, the ALJ held that the Town had violated the Act as 
alleged and ordered the employees restored to their former 
positions and CWA reimbursed for the costs of the improper 
practice proceeding, including its attorneys' legal fees. 
The Town argues in its exceptions that the ALJ's reliance 
upon a "history of animosity toward the CWA" incorrectly shifted 
Substituted as counsel after issuance of ALJ's decision. 
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the burden of proof to the Town, that its personnel actions were 
not improperly motivated nor its defenses pretexts, and that the 
awarding of litigation costs to CWA is punitive or otherwise not 
appropriate. 
CWA argues in response that the ALJ's decision is correct 
and that the remedial order is appropriate and necessary to 
effectuate the policies of the Act. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision on the merits, but 
reverse that part of the order requiring the Town to pay CWA's 
litigation costs. 
As to the Town's first exception, the ALJ did not use the 
Town's history of having been found to have committed improper 
practices as the only or even a main basis for her decision. Nor 
did the ALJ use that history to shift the burden of proof to the 
Town. The ALJ properly used the Town's labor relations history 
as one of several factors supporting the conclusion she reached. 
When motivation is in issue, as in this case, an employer's 
documented history of union animosity can help a charging party 
persuade the trier of fact that the motivation for the action in 
issue under the charge is unlawful, as it alleges, and not 
legitimate, as is often claimed by respondents and the Town here. 
The Town argues also that the ALJ's decision is not 
supported by the record and that her credibility determinations 
should be reversed. We find, however, that the ALJ's decision is 
clearly supported by the record, which also affords us no basis 
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to reverse the ALJ's demeanor-based credibility resolutions. As 
fully explained by the ALJ in her detailed decision, the Town's 
articulated reasons for its personnel actions do not withstand 
any meaningful examination. 
Mangino and McCombs were the only employees who lost their 
positions, even though there were many less senior. As detailed 
in the ALJ's decision, the layoffs were not consistent with the 
Town's articulated financial needs and were reached in a manner 
entirely inconsistent with the Town's past personnel practices. 
Moreover, the Town's assertion in its answer to the charge that 
it was unaware of Mangino's and McCombs' status within CWA was 
proven to be wholly incredible at the hearing by witnesses' 
admissions and other record evidence. 
The only rationale proffered by the Town for Youngman's 
transfer was that it came to a conclusion that her job was 
finance-related and, therefore, she should be transferred to an 
office under the direct supervision of the Town's finance 
director. Youngman, however, is a fourteen-year employee of the 
Town and her work before and after the transfer is unchanged in 
any material respect. As with Mangino and McCombs, Youngman's 
transfer was inconsistent with the Town's existing personnel 
practices and the work locations of other employees whose jobs 
include finance-related duties. There is, quite simply, no 
credible explanation for a transfer that is inefficient, if not 
wholly illogical, other than that the Town hoped that by 
Board - U-15937 -4 
isolating Youngman it could prevent her from being an effective 
advocate for unit employees on grievances and other employment-
related issues. 
As to the remedial order, the Town challenges only that part 
concerning the payment of CWA's litigation costs, including its 
attorneys' fees. We have stated several times in past decisions 
that such an order can effectuate the policies of the Act, but 
only in unusual circumstances.^ However, in no case have we 
ordered a party paid for the costs it has incurred in litigating 
an improper practice charge, finding in each case that the 
circumstances did not justify such an award. Moreover, we have 
not discussed what circumstances would justify such an award. 
The order and the exceptions in this case require and warrant an 
explanation of our remedial policy in this regard. 
In articulating our policy regarding an award of litigation 
costs to a charging party, we look to the policy and practices 
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) because in all 
relevant respects the remedial provisions and policies are 
identical to those under the Act. The National Labor Relations 
Board's (NLRB) long-standing remedial policy, like ours, is to 
order litigation costs only in exceptional circumstances. As 
that remedial policy was very recently reviewed and clarified by 
^Citv Sch. Dist. of the Citv of Port Jervis. 24 PERB 53031 
(1991); State of New York. 18 PERB 53008 (1985); United Fed'n of 
Teachers. Local 2. 16 PERB 53052 (1983); United Fed'n of 
Teachers. Local 2. 15 PERB 53103 (1982); Westbury Teachers Ass'n. 
14 PERB 53063 (1981). 
Board - U-15937 -5 
the NLRB,2/ there are two categories of exceptional 
circumstances. First, litigation costs are appropriately ordered 
as part of make-whole relief if the respondent's defenses are 
frivolous. If, however, the defenses are debatable, litigation 
costs are not appropriately ordered under the NLRA even if those 
defenses are ultimately rejected. A respondent's defenses are 
deemed debatable and nonfrivolous if they turn on genuine 
questions of credibility. The reasoning supporting this 
dichotomy, one we find persuasive, is that respondents must not 
be discouraged from availing themselves of the processes of the 
applicable labor relations statute when there is doubt regarding 
whether a violation of that statute has been committed. 
Moreover, a respondent should not be faulted because it did not 
accurately ascertain the credibility of its witnesses or failed 
to predict how their demeanor as witnesses would be judged. 
In this case, although certain of the Town's defenses did 
not rest on credibility issues, and were clearly frivolous, the 
crux of its defense as to all three employees did turn on 
credibility questions. The A U ultimately resolved those 
questions in favor of the CWA after a full analysis of the issues 
on both sides of the credibility question. We, therefore, do not 
find that the Town's defense in material part was devoid of any 
legitimate issue of credibility. 
^Frontier Hotel ^Unbelievable. Inc.). 318 NLRB No. 60, 150 LRRM 
1065 (1995). 
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The NLRB, with judicial approval, has also held that 
litigation costs are appropriately ordered in those cases which 
are marked by an exceptional degree of unlawful conduct where 
traditional remedies cannot adequately prevent the unfair or 
improper labor practice. This second basis is reserved for 
particularly extreme cases, usually arising in the context of 
persistent and pervasive misconduct.3/ 
In this case, the ALJ relied, in part, on the Town's 
improper practice history to justify the order requiring the 
payment of litigation costs. We do not believe, however, that 
that history warrants an exceptional order calling for the 
payment of CWA's litigation costs. The violations found to have 
been committed by the Town in the past do not reflect any 
consistent pattern. Only one charge prior to this one appears to 
have involved improperly motivated personnel decisions. At least 
one other personnel decision was found not to have been 
improperly motivated. Certain other violations were premised 
upon allegations which were deemed admitted based upon the Town's 
refusal to comply with our Rules of Procedure pertaining to 
attendance at pre-hearing conferences and the filing of answers. 
Even the total number of charges filed against the Town is not 
extraordinary. 
Although we are disturbed by the Town's seeming willingness 
in this case to raise in its answer certain defenses which it 
5/See J.P. Stevens & Co. V. NLRB. 668 F.2d 767, 109 LRRM 2345 
(4th Cir. 1982), remanded. 458 U.S. 1118, 110 LRRM 2896 (1982). 
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either knew or should have known were untrue, we do not believe 
that that circumstance alone can justify an order requiring the 
payment of litigation costs. There are sanctions available 
within and without the administrative context for the prevention 
of such conduct and we would not hesitate to invoke them as 
warranted in future cases. In this case, however, the Town can 
be induced to adhere to its duties under the Act and we can 
effectively prevent this and further improper practices by our 
traditional remedies calling for reinstatement and back pay with 
interest, a restoration of the status quo, and a posting of 
notice. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Town's exceptions are 
denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed except insofar as the 
ALT ordered the Town to reimburse CWA for the costs, including 
legal fees, of this improper practice proceeding. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Town: 
1. Immediately reestablish the Motor Equipment Operator 
positions which were formerly occupied by Scott Mangino 
and John McCombs and offer reinstatement in those 
positions to those two employees. 
2. Immediately make Scott Mangino whole for any wages and 
benefits lost by reason of the abolition of his 
position, with interest at the currently prevailing 
maximum legal rate, from the date of his termination 
from employment until the date of his reemployment or 
his refusal of an unconditional offer of reinstatement. 
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3. Immediately make John McCombs whole for any wages and 
benefits lost by reason of the abolition of his 
position, with interest at the currently prevailing 
maximum legal rate, from the date of his termination 
from employment until the date of his reemployment or 
his refusal of an unconditional offer of reinstatement. 
4. Immediately rescind the transfer of Marlene Youngman to 
the Finance Department, reappoint her to her former 
forty-hour per week administrative assistant position 
in the Public Works Department, and return her to the 
office she occupied in July 1994, prior to her transfer 
to the Finance Department. 
5. Immediately make Marlene Youngman whole for any wages 
and benefits lost by reason of her transfer to the 
Finance Department, with interest at the currently 
prevailing maximum legal rate. 
6. Sign and post notice in the form attached at all 
locations ordinarily used to post notices of 
information to employees in the unit represented by 
CWA. 
DATED: December 27, 1995 
Albany, New York 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Communication Workers of America, Local 1170 that the Town 
of Henrietta will: 
1. Immediately reestablish the Motor Equipment Operator positions which were formerly occupied by Scott 
Mangino and John McCombs and offer reinstatement in those positions to those two employees. 
2. Immediately make Scott Mangino whole for any wages and benefits lost by reason of the abolition of his 
position, with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate, from the date of his termination from 
employment until the date of his reemployment or his refusal of an unconditional offer of reinstatement. 
3. Immediately make John McCombs whole for any wages and benefits lost by reason of the abolition of his 
) position, with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate, from the date of his termination from 
employment until the date of his reemployment or his refusal of an unconditional offer of reinstatement. 
4. Immediately rescind the transfer of Marlene Youngman to the Finance Department, reappoint her to her 
former forty-hour per week administrative assistant position in the Public Works Department, and return her 
to the office she occupied in July 1994, prior to her transfer to the Finance Department. 
5. Immediately make Marlene Youngman whole for any wages and benefits lost by reason of her transfer to the 
Finance Department, with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
Dated By . . . 
(Representative) (Title) 
TOWN OF HENRIETTA 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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STATE OF MEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SIDNEY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NEW YORK 
STATE UNITED TEACHERS, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15018 
SIDNEY CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
PETER D. BLOOD, for Charging Party 
FRANK SAYERS and MARK PETTITT, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Sidney 
Teachers Association, New York State United Teachers, AFT, AFL-
CIO (NYSUT) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (AU) 
dismissing its improper practice charge which alleges that the 
Sidney Central School District (District) violated §209-a.l(d) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally 
abolishing two school nurse-teacher positions and reassigning 
their duties to two newly created school nurse positions. The 
A U dismissed the charge because NYSUT had not complied with the 
notice of claim requirements of Education Law §3813. 
We reverse the ALJ's decision on the basis of the Appellate 
Division, Third Department's recent decision in Deposit Central 
School District v. PERB (hereafter Deposit) .^ That case was 
y A.D.2d , 28 PERB fl7013 (3d Dep't 1995). 
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decided by the Appellate Division after the AKT issued her 
decision. In Depositf the Court held that there is substantial 
compliance with the notice of claim provisions of Education Law 
§3813 if a school district's governing body receives a copy of a 
sufficiently detailed improper practice charge within ninety days 
after the claim or claims asserted therein arose. The claims 
here arose on or about September 7, 1993, when the school nurses 
allegedly began performing the duties which had previously been 
performed by the school nurse-teachers. The District answered 
the charge on November 11, 1993, thereby establishing, under 
Deposit, that it received its copy of the improper practice 
charge within ninety days after the claim arose. The charge 
filed herein is as detailed as the charge in Deposit, setting 
forth the nature of the claim and the time, place and manner in 
which the claim arose. On the basis of the Court's holding in 
Deposit, which we have followed,^ we hold that the notice of 
claim requirements of Education Law §3813 have been met. 
For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the ALT is 
reversed and the case is remanded to the AKT for further 
processing consistent with our decision herein. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: December 27, 1995 
Albany, New York 
^Sidney Cent. Sch. Dist.. 28 PERB 53066 (1995). 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, GENESEE COUNTY 
LOCAL #819, CITY OF BATAVIA EMPLOYEES UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15142 
CITY OF BATAVIA, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MIGUEL ORTIZ Of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
DAMON & MOREY (JAMES SCHMIT of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Genesee County Local #819, City of Batavia Employees Unit (CSEA) 
to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) dismissing its 
charge that the City of Batavia (City) violated §209-a.l(d) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally 
subcontracting the operation of the City's ice arena to a private 
contractor. The ALJ held that CSEA had waived its right to 
negotiate the subcontracting and that CSEA did not have 
exclusivity over the subcontracted work. 
CSEA excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the 
management rights clause which the ALJ held constituted the 
waiver of the right to negotiate the subcontracting was not a 
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source of a right to the City and that the record supports a 
finding that CSEA employees had performed the transferred work 
exclusively. The City supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based on our review of the record and after consideration of 
the parties' arguments, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
The City had operated an ice arena for many years as part of 
its recreation program. In the fall of 1993, CSEA became aware 
that the City had subcontracted the operation of the arena to a 
private contractor. The City had employed a Recreation Director, 
an Assistant Recreation Director, a Recreation Operations 
Assistant, two part-time Recreation Operations Assistants^, a 
Building Maintenance Man, and several part-time cashiers. The 
Assistant Recreation Director and the Recreation Operations 
Assistant were in the unit represented by CSEA, the Building 
Maintenance Man was represented by another employee organization 
and the Recreation Director and the part-time employees were 
unrepresented. The record shows that all the employees at the 
arena performed each other's duties, which included, inter alia, 
custodial work, answering phones, renting and sharpening skates, 
operating the "Zamboni", maintaining the ice, ensuring safety and 
making minor repairs to the eguipment and the arena. The only 
duty not shared by all of the arena employees was supervision of 
staff. However, the full-time Recreation Operations Assistant, a 
ixIn 1988, the unit employee holding this position retired. The 
position was then filled by two part-time employees who were 
excluded from CSEA's unit. 
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unit position, and the two unrepresented part-time Recreation 
Operations Assistants performed identical job duties, including 
supervision of the part-time cashiers. The Assistant Recreation 
Director, a unit employee, also performed all of the above duties 
as well as some scheduling of staff and hours of operation. The 
record further reflects that the Recreation Director, an 
unrepresented employee, scheduled events and supervised employees 
at the arena at times. The ALJ held that because of this 
commingling of duties, CSEA did not possess the requisite 
exclusivity over the operations of the arena. 
A duty to negotiate the decision to transfer unit work 
arises, absent a controlling defense, if the work transferred has 
been performed by unit employees exclusively and the reassigned 
tasks are substantially similar to those that had been performed 
by unit employees.-7 Here, the work of operating the arena, 
including scheduling and supervision of staff, was performed by 
both unit and nonunit personnel.-7 Lacking exclusivity, CSEA 
cannot prevail on its charge that the City unilaterally 
subcontracted bargaining unit work in violation of §2 09-a.l(d) of 
the Act. 
Having concluded that the charge must be dismissed on this 
ground, we do not decide whether, by agreement or otherwise, CSEA 
^Niagara-Frontier Transp. Auth. , 18 PERB [^3083 (1985) . 
-%e do not need to decide, therefore, whether the work performed 
by the private contractor is substantially similar to the work 
performed by the employees in CSEA's unit. 
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waived any right to negotiate the City's transfer of this or 
other unit work. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and 
it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 27, 1995 
Albany, New York 
IC/fWf (. 
Pauline, R. "Kinsella," Chairperson 
/y£44^1^ 
Eric J< Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHARLES J. MUNAFO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16638 
STATEN ISLAND RAPID TRANSIT 
OPERATING AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
CHARLES J. MUNAFO, £TO se 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, ACTING VICE-PRESIDENT AND GENERAL 
COUNSEL (EDWARD F. ZAGAJESKI of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Charles J. 
Munafo to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (AU) on a 
charge filed against the Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating 
Authority (SIRTOA). The charge as processed alleges that SIRTOA 
violated §209-a.l(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) when it had a transit police officer escort Munafo from 
SIRTOA's property for allegedly holding an unauthorized union 
meeting on March 29, 1995. After a hearing, the ALJ held that 
SIRTOA had not violated the Act. The ALJ found that there was a 
meeting that date and concluded that SIRTOA could prohibit 
meetings without its permission. 
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Munafo excepts to the ALJ's decision, basically arguing that 
he was not conducting a union meeting, just conversing with unit 
employees when they were not working. SIRTOA argues that the 
ALJ's decision is correct and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and having considered the 
parties' arguments, we reverse the ALJ's decision. 
The ALJ concluded that SIRTOA was privileged to remove 
Munafo from its premises on March 29, 1995, because he was 
conducting a union meeting without permission, contrary to 
SIRTOA's existing policy. The ALJ's decision assumes the 
validity of SIRTOA's policy, an assumption itself resting upon a 
theory that an employer has the right under the Act to regulate 
and control the use of its property. Although our decisions are 
careful to recognize the property rights of public employers, our 
reversal of the ALJ's decision is occasioned by our belief that 
this case, on its facts, simply does not present an issue of 
SIRTOA's property rights. 
Munafo is a SIRTOA track worker and vice-chairperson of 
United Transportation Union, Local 1440, which represents many of 
SIRTOA's employees. According to the record evidence, a 
discussion took place among a number of employees, including 
Munafo, who were gathered during "wash-up" time in an all-purpose 
room (a room to which employees are entitled to go for lunch and 
other breaks, wash-up time, etc.) about the availability of union 
representation during Munafo's absence from work, workers' 
compensation reports, and literature he had about the Act. 
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Munafo was admittedly on SIRTOA's property with permission on the 
day in question, as he was on several earlier occasions, even 
though he was not working due to an injury sustained at work. 
SIRTOA Superintendent Alfonso W. Sorrentino, who caused Munafo's 
removal from the premises on March 29, testified that persons in 
Munafo's work status have "no restrictions" and "can come and go" 
on SIRTOA property. His presence in the particular room where 
the union "meeting" was allegedly held was equally authorized, as 
was the presence of the employees to whom or with whom Munafo was 
speaking. Once it is admitted that Munafo and the employees were 
where they were permitted to be at the time they were present, 
and that they were not, at that time, expected or required to be 
engaged in any work activity, the recognized property rights of 
an employer to control access to or the use of its property are 
satisfied and no longer controlling. 
Employees have a right protected under the Act to discuss 
employment issues with other employees while on their employer's 
premises, so long as the communication is not disruptive to the 
performance of any work, at least in circumstances in which all 
speech of any kind while actively at work is not forbidden. A 
work rule prohibiting talking would be highly unusual and SIRTOA 
does not forbid employees from talking during the workday. No 
policy, rule or practice of an employer can interfere with the 
employees' protected right of communication and we find nothing 
in this record to suggest that the employees or any union on 
their behalf waived that right. 
Board - U-16638 -4 
Unlike the ALJ, our analysis of this case does not hinge on 
whether the March 29, 1995 assembly was a "meeting".^ Assuming 
it was, either the policy Sorrentino relied upon was never 
intended by SIRTOA to reach "meetings" of the type in issue here 
or, if so intended, it conflicts with the fundamental rights of 
employees under the Act. Under either interpretation, the 
"meetings" policy cannot form the basis for a defense justifying 
Sorrentino's expulsion of Munafo from SIRTOA's premises. 
Our decision is limited to the facts of this case involving 
conversations occurring during "meetings" between and among 
SIRTOA's employees who are on SIRTOA's property with permission, 
in locations to which their access is authorized, and which do 
not interfere with work-related duties. Nothing in this decision 
restricts SIRTOA's right to control access to its property by 
nonemployees or by employees whose presence at the worksite is 
not permitted generally or at a specific location. We hold in 
this case only that SIRTOA improperly caused Munafo to be 
expelled from its premises. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
reversed and SIRTOA is held to have violated §209-a.l(a) as 
alleged. 
^We would note, however, that the ALJ's rationale requires an 
endless series of fact-specific line drawings as to whether, and 
to what extent, communication among two or more employees might 
constitute a "meeting", thus invoking an employer's property 
interests. Such a result would inevitably cause litigation and 
chill employees from exercising their statutory right to talk 
among themselves about their representation and other employment-
related issues. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that SIRTOA cease and desist from 
causing the expulsion from SIRTOA property of any employee 
covered by the Act for conversing, communicating, or meeting with 
other covered employees about employment-related issues in 
locations at which the employees' presence is authorized and in 
circumstances which are not disruptive to the performance of 
work. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that SIRTOA sign and post notice in 
the form attached in all locations at which notices of 
information to its employees are ordinarily posted. 
DATED: December 27, 1995 
Albany, New York 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT (Act) 
we hereby notify all employees that the Staten Island Rapid Transit Operation Authority (SIRTOA) will not cause the expulsion 
from SIRTOA property of any employee covered by the Act for conversing, communicating or meeting with other covered 
employees about employment-related issues in locations at which the employees' presence is authorized and in 
circumstances which are not disruptive to the performance of work. 
^ 
Dated . By . . . . . . 
(Representative) (Title) 
STATEN ISLAND RAPID TRANSIT OPERATING AUTHORITY 
TNS Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WILLIAM PATRICK O'HARA, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16951 
ORANGE COUNTY CORRECTION OFFICERS 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
HAYWARD, PARKER & O'LEARY (RICHARD L. PARKER of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by William Patrick 
O'Hara to a decision by the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation (Director) on a charge O'Hara filed 
against the Orange County Correction Officers Benevolent 
Association (COBA). The charge alleges that in November 1993 
COBA breached its duty of fair representation in violation of 
§209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) in 
conjunction with the processing of a disciplinary grievance. As 
the charge was not filed until July 1995, the Director dismissed 
it as untimely. 
Although admitting that the improper practice occurred to 
his knowledge in November 1993, O'Hara argues in his exceptions 
that the four-month filing period in §204.1(a)(1) of our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules) should be tolled until April 22, 1995, because 
it was then that COBA informed him that its efforts in court to 
compel arbitration of his grievance failed. If the filing period 
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is tolled to April 1995, then the charge is timely because it was 
filed within four months of that date. COBA has not filed a 
response to O'Hara's exceptions. 
Having considered the exceptions, we affirm the Director's 
decision. 
As the Director noted in his decision, we have not tolled 
the filing period while ancillary proceedings are being pursued 
by or on behalf of a charging party even if those proceedings 
have the potential to effectively moot the improper practice 
alleged. In urging reversal of the Director, O'Hara argues that 
we should adopt the continuous representation doctrine applicable 
to civil legal malpractice actions.^ The continuous 
representation doctrine tolls the applicable statute of 
limitations for so long as the attorney is representing the 
client in the case. The rationale is that the client should not 
have to jeopardize his or her case or the relationship with the 
attorney while the attorney is representing that person. 
O'Hara alleges that COBA was serving as his attorney in 
seeking a judicial order compelling the arbitration of his 
grievance which was denied him by his employer,^ and argues 
that he should not be required to bring an improper practice 
charge against COBA concerning the internal processing of that 
grievance until a date within four months of the date COBA failed 
to secure judicial relief. 
^Glamm v. Allen. 57 N.Y.2d 87 (1982). 
^The appeal to arbitration was untimely because it was misfiled. 
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The four months allowed for the filing of improper practice 
charges is intentionally short.57 There is a particular need in 
labor relations to prevent stale litigation given the nature of 
the ongoing relationship between and among public employers, 
unions and public employees. Our unwillingness to toll that 
filing period under a variety of circumstances has been 
considered necessary to give effect to the policies underlying 
that short filing period. For example, to toll the filing period 
as requested in this case would permit a charge against COBA two 
years after the commission of the improper practices alleged. We 
do not consider such a result to be consistent with the policies 
of the Act or the intent of the filing period rules as applied. 
Moreover, even were we to consider applying the continuous 
representation doctrine in duty of fair representation cases, it 
would not be appropriate to do so here. Under O'Hara's proposed 
application of the doctrine, not only would the limitations period 
be tolled for the length of time it took COBA to process his 
grievance to conclusion in the grievance procedure, but also for 
the length of time it took COBA to process to conclusion the court 
proceedings seeking reinstatement of the grievance. We understand 
that the continuous representation doctrine does not apply to 
representation in discrete actions. The grievance procedure and 
-'The reprisal rules in effect prior to the statutory amendment 
in 1969 adding the improper practice provisions to the Act 
required a charge to be filed within 60 days of the act of 
reprisal. The current four-month rule, therefore, actually 
represents a filing period more generous than that originally 
available. 
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the court case are two entirely separate proceedings, with 
distinct bases and relationships.^7 Therefore, even though the 
judicial proceeding was brought to try to correct the effects of 
the alleged "malpractice" committed during the internal 
processing of the grievance, that would not constitute continuous 
representation. As such, even if we were to apply the continuous 
representation doctrine, an application would be limited to a 
duty of fair representation charge filed within four months of 
the exhaustion of the grievance procedure. This charge was not 
so filed. Although we have questions about the appropriateness 
of applying the continuous representation doctrine to any of our 
improper practice proceedings in any circumstances, we find no 
reason to apply an expanded version of that doctrine in this 
case. The exceptions are, accordingly, denied and the Director's 
decision is affirmed. 
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that the 
charge must bes and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: December 27, 1995 
Albany, New York 
^The relationship between O'Hara and COBA during the processing 
of the grievance within the contractual procedure is not properly 
characterized as one involving attorney-client. 
.fauigjie K. jsinsena, unairperson 
Eric J. Schmertz, Membt 
